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1 Introduction
In some countries, cellular wireless roaming charges are prohibitive possibly
because the incumbent access-provider is actually or essentially state-run,
unlike potential entrants, i.e., the regulator (state) is in a conflict of inter-
est. In other countries, e.g., France, there is a lot of competition among
Internet Service (access) Providers (ISPs). Recently, Free purchased a spec-
trum license to compete in the 4G market. Free is an established discount
broadband (wired) ISP likely intending to bundle its existing offerings with
cellular wireless. The cellular-wireless incumbents such as Orange disputed
Free’s position on roaming charges for its customers while Free builds out
its wireless infrastructure and offers highly discounted access rates to attract
customers (though Free’s service is quota limited and considered of poorer
quality and support, the latter particularly through physical store-fronts) [3].
Orange does lease some of its existing infrastructure to third-party discount
providers such as Virgin Wireless (which does not offer bundled services in
direct competition with Orange).
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The Canadian government also recently considered regulating roaming
charges [2] for similar reasons: the entrant wishes relatively low roaming
charges so as to be able to offer competitive prices and attract customers
while not operating at a severe loss in the short term, whereas the incumbents
demand that their higher operating costs are respected including minimally
profitable legacy services (e.g., telephony) that they are obliged to maintain.
Left to the incumbents, roaming charges may rise to create a barrier to entry
into the cellular wireless market.
We consider two competing cellular wireless access providers, indexed
1 and 2, that serve overlapping areas. The coverage lapses of the entrant
2 can be accommodated by the incumbent 1, but not vice versa, i.e., the
entrant 2 has much less deployed infrastructure than incumbent 1. So as
not to trivialize matters, we assume that the entrant attempts to maintain
profitability while it grows its cellular wireless access infrastructure. The
roaming charge is assumed regulated, i.e., it’s not controlled by either access
provider.
2 Asymmetric case with large incumbent (1)
and a small entrant (2)
2.1 Demand response and ISP-player utilities
Let φ be the fraction of the entrant’s demand that roams and let r be the
associated roaming charges per unit demand. We assume that the effective
price of the entrant’s customers is p2 + φr, where pk is the access price for
the kth ISP.
We use a model of demand that considers both response to price and
congestion as in e.g., [4], but in our model the congestion based term implic-
itly depends on demand itself so that the incumbent and entrant demands,
respectively, satisfy [5]:
D1 = Dmax(1− δp¯) p2 + φr
p1 + p2 + φr
g1(D1 + φD2, B1) (1)
D2 = Dmax(1− δp¯) p1
p1 + p2 + φr
g2((1− φ)D2, B2) (2)
where:
• The first term accounts for how total demand is sensitive to price, here
assumed linearly decreasing with average1 access price from maximum,
p¯ =
p1 + (p2 + φr)
2
, (3)
where δDmax is the demand sensitivity to price.
• The second (competition) factor models how demand is divided be-
tween the ISPs based on their access price, i.e., ISP k’s demand is
inversely proportional to pk, e.g., [1].
• The third factor models how demand depends on congestion via a “de-
mand capacity” parameter B and “headroom” parameter γ > 0 [5]:
g(D,B) decreases with D < B − γ and increases with B, g(0, B) ≡
1 ≡ g(D,∞) and g(B − γ,B) ≡ 0. For example, a nonlinear g(·, B)
based on the mean delay of an M/M/1 queue [7] is g(D,B) = (1 −
γ/(B − D))/(1 − γ/B). A simpler, linearized congestion factor is
g(D,B) = 1−D/(B − γ).
The incumbent and entrant ISP utilities are, respectively,
U1(p1, p2) = (p1 − cd,1)D1 + (r − cd,1)φD2 − cb,1B1
U2(p2, p1) = (p2 − (1− φ)cd,2)D2 − cb,2B2
where cb is demand-independent operational expenditures (op-ex), including
amortized capital expenditures, cap-ex) per-unit infrastructure resource (B),
and cd is per-unit demand-dependent op-ex.
2.2 Game set-up, simplifications and discussion of ob-
jectives
We now assume that demand-dependent op-ex cd are negligible for analytical
simplicity. The infrastructure based costs will not impact Nash equilibrium
prices and will complicate our notion of “fairness” regarding roaming charges,
cf., (7). So in this section, we will assume cb ≈ 0 too. We also consider the
1More general or complex forms of demand response could be numerically considered,
including one instead involving a “social” average price implicitly dependent on demand,
e.g., p¯ = (D1p1 +D2(p2 + φr))/(D1 +D2).
system free of congestion2, i.e., g1, g2 ≈ 1 in (1) and (2). Thus, we will
consider the following utility functions
U1(p1, p2)/Dmax = p1(1− δp¯) p2 + φr
p1 + p2 + φr
+ rφ(1− δp¯) p1
p1 + p2 + φr
(4)
U2(p2, p1)/Dmax = p2(1− δp¯) p1
p1 + p2 + φr
(5)
Assuming both sets of customers roam in the same domain (that of the
incumbent), we can take the roaming factor
φ =
B1 −B2
B1
= 1− B2
B1
. (6)
Thus, the simplified system has three positive parameters in addition to
initial prices (play-actions): φ, δ, r. Again, we assume that the roaming factor
r is set by a regulator.
2.3 Objectives
Assuming B1  B2 (φ ≈ 1), our objective herein is to determine the Nash
equilibrium (NE) prices p∗1, p
∗
2 and see how the NE utilities U
∗ depend on the
roaming charge, r. The impact of the demand-sensitivity-to-price parameter
δDmax will be to simply shift and scale the NE prices.
Specifically, we want to see whether fairness is achieved at NE, i.e., whether
net revenue is proportional to expenditures:
U∗1 (r)
B1
=
U∗2 (r)
B2
, (7)
equivalently under (6), whether
(1− φ)U∗1 (r)− U∗2 (r) = 0. (8)
2Without congestion and under the model of received demand inversely proportionate
to price, the average “social” price (footnote 1) is the harmonic average, p¯−1 = (p−11 +
p−12 )/2.
2.4 Analytical results for simplified system
An “interior” (strictly positive, finite) solution to the first-order necessary
conditions (FONC),
∂U1
∂p1
= 0 =
∂U2
∂p2
, (9)
of (4) and (5) is a symmetric one where both NE prices
p∗1, p
∗
2 =
1
4δ
(
−2δrφ+ 1 +
√
4δrφ+ 1
)
> 0 (10)
when
δrφ < 2, (11)
i.e., when there are feasible prices (p1, p2) according to
p1 + p2 ≤ −rφ+ 2/δ.
Indeed, it can be directly verified that p∗1 + p
∗
2 = 2p
∗
1 = 2p
∗
2 < −rφ+ 2/δ.
These prices also satisfy ∂2U1/∂p
2
1, ∂
2U2/∂p
2
2 < 0, with strictly positive
utilities U∗1 , U
∗
2 > 0 under (11), so that indeed they are “locally Nash.” The
other solutions of the FONC (9) either have p∗2 < 0 (i.e., extraneous) or
p∗1 = 0. But if p
∗
1 = 0 then U
∗
1 = 0 = U
∗
2 . Also, if p2 = 0 then ∂U2/∂p2 > 0.
So, there are no boundary Nash equilibria and thus (10) is the unique Nash
equilibrium.
It can also be directly shown for this model that there is a solution
r∗ :=
2(2− φ)
δ(4− 3φ)2 (12)
at which (8) holds. Note that r∗ < 2(δφ)−1 for 0 ≤ φ < 1. Roaming prices
r < r∗ favor the entrant, otherwise the incumbent, cf., next subsection.
2.5 Numerical results
We considered the example with δ = 1 and φ = 0.9 = 1 − B2/B1. For
the model without congestion under (11), the two “best response” curves for
r = 0.8 are given in Figure 1. That is, the first curve has vertical distance to
the x-axis,
p∗2(p1) = arg max
0≤p2≤pmax
U2(p2, p1).
The second curve has horizontal distance to the y-axis,
p∗1(p2) = arg max
0≤p1≤pmax
U1(p1, p2).
These curves meet at the Nash equilibrium, here (p∗1, p
∗
2) ≈ (0.38, 0.38) which
is consistent with (10).
Figure 1: Best-response curves for φ = 0.9, δ = 1, r = 0.8
We also numerically verified that Nash-equilibrium utilities U∗1 (r) and
U∗2 (r) are positive, see Figure 2. Both decrease and reach zero at r =
2(δφ)−1 = 20/9 (again, a point where the only feasible prices are p1 = 0 =
p2). Note that utilities are generally higher for lower roaming charges in our
simple model.
In Figure 3, we plot the “fairness” expression in (8) and verify that (8)
holds at r∗ ≈ 1.3 < 20/9, consistent with (12). And we see from this figure
how roaming prices r < r∗ favor the entrant, otherwise the incumbent.
3 Future work
Recall that we assumed negligible op-ex, i.e., assumed cb, cd ≈ 0. Depend-
ing on the situation, op-ex per unit demand might be lower for the entrant
Figure 2: Utilities of the incumbent U∗1 (r))/Dmax (solid line) and entrant
U∗2 (r)/Dmax (dashed line) versus roaming charge r with φ = 0.9, δ = 1
(e.g., only present in areas involving cheaper deployment costs and higher
customer density) or for the incumbent (generally owing to greater scale of
operations). Such a discrepancy could be accounted for in our “fairness”
condition (7). Future work will also consider the effects of congestion, more
complex price-competition and price-sensitivity models, and multiple com-
peting incumbents and entrants (as in [1]).
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